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Abstract. We investigate the effect of fiscal policy on equilibrium determinacy in a 
New Keynesian economy with rule-of-thumb (liquidity constrained) consumers and 
capital accumulation by focusing on the inter-action between monetary policy and 
taxation under the assumption of balanced budget. Our main finding is that taxation of 
firms’ monopoly rents reduces the parameter range within which the Taylor principle 
is insufficient to guarantee equilibrium determinacy; hence it supports the 
determinacy of the rational expectation equilibrium. 
 
Keywords: Rule-of-thumb consumers, equilibrium determinacy, fiscal and monetary 
policy inter-actions, tax distortions, balanced government budget.   




There is a large literature on tax distortions, balanced budget rules and equilibrium 
indeterminacy suggesting that policy feedback rules linking monetary and fiscal 
instruments to the state of the economy can induce endogenous fluctuations and hence be 
destabilizing.
1 King et al. (1988), e.g., show that in a real business cycle model the 
amplitude of the business cycle increases when the government follows a 
balanced-budget rule and finances government spending with income taxes. 
Schmitt-Grohè and Uribe (1997a), in a central contribution, prove that expectations of 
future higher tax rates can be self-fulfilled when income taxation is endogenously 
determined in order to balance the budget whereas the growth rate of government 
expenditure is exogenously fixed. 
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1 See, among other, King et al. (1988), Leeper (1991), Woodford (1994), Sims (1994), Schmitt-Grohe and 
Uribe (1997a, 1997b, 2000), Leith and Wren-Lewis (2000), Gali et al. (2003), Guo and Harrison (2004).    2
Guo and Harrison (2004) illustrate that Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe’s indeterminacy result 
in the real business cycle models depends crucially on a fiscal policy where the tax rate 
decreases with the household’s taxable income, i.e. constant government expenditures 
financed by proportional taxation on income. Specifically, they modify Schmitt-Grohé 
and Uribe’s analysis by allowing for endogenous public spending and transfers financed 
by separate fixed tax rates, a different balanced-budget rule that is commonly used in the 
real business cycle literature. Under their formulation, the economy does not display 
endogenous business cycles driven by agents’ animal spirit. 
Following the Guo and Harrison’s formulation we aim to contrast the instability of the 
aggregate economy, by suggesting that in a New Keynesian (NEK) DSGE model with 
rule-of-thumb behavior, as introduced by Galì et al. (2003, 2004), a balanced budget rule 
may actually reduce the scope for indeterminacy.  
More in details, Galì et al. (2003, 2004) show that the presence of a significant proportion 
of households that do not participate in the financial market affects the conditions under 
which a standard Taylor rule delivers uniqueness of the rational expectation equilibrium.
2 
The Gali and coauthors’ result can be explained as follows. In a canonical New 
Keynesian model with sticky prices, a coefficient larger than one in the Taylor rule 
implies a countercyclical response of monetary policy. Shocks that boost economic 
activity and inflation induce a monetary response that raises the real interest rate thus 
moderating consumption spending by financially unrestricted consumers and reducing 
private investment. The presence of rule-of-thumb consumers changes this in two ways. 
First the standard interest rate effect operates only through a small proportion of 
unrestricted consumers and, second, the increase in economic activity that leads to an 
increase in inflation also increases real wages and thus consumption of restricted 
consumers. In order to bring inflation under control and rule out sunspots the reaction of 
the real interest rate must be stronger rather than the canonical model. 
We argue that the above result is not invariant to a public expenditure financed by 
different taxations and that, more precisely, once corporate income tax is introduced, 
fiscal policies based on budged balanced constraints may stabilize the economy 
differently from the common wisdom. The intuition behind our results is as follows. An 
                                                 
2 In addition to Gali et al. (2003, 2004), the effects of rule-of-thumb consumers on monetary policy have 
been studied also by Amato and Laubach (2003), Bilbiie (2004), Colciago (2007), Di Bartolomeo and Rossi 
(2007). For applications of this assumption to fiscal policy see Mankiw (2000) and references therein.   3
expectation-driven increase in activity and inflation gives a rise in real wages and a 
decline in firms’ markups due to price stickiness. Lower markups mean lower revenues 
from corporate taxation, because tax rates are constant. Hence, in order to balance the 
budget, government cuts expenditure which in itself reduces aggregate demand. This 
effect of fiscal policy runs completely opposite to the effect of rule-of-thumb 
consumption, since the latter generates a positive correlation between real wages and 
aggregate demand. The countercyclical behavior of markups, well-known in this class of 
models, is associated to a decrease in profits since dividends follow the same pattern of 
markups. A corporate taxation combined with the specific balanced budget arrangement 
can diminish tax revenues, government expenditures and aggregate demand and stabilize 
the economy. Furthermore labor and income taxation does not have this effect. In fact, 
only by counter-balancing the output expansion driven by animal spirits is possible to 
rule out sunspots. While profit taxation reduces tax revenues and, hence, aggregate 
demand, labor and income taxes go in the opposite direction because of the increase in 
output and employment.  
We only partially confirm the Guo and Harrison’s result in New Keynesian models. The 
existence of a time-varying government expenditures and income taxation are not a 
sufficient condition to deter equilibrium indeterminacy only the introduction of the profit 
taxation is necessary to obtain a stabilizing fiscal policy in a canonical New Keynesian 
model augmented with liquidity constrained consumers.  
The rest paper is structured as follows. Next section describes the basic framework. 
Section 3 derives the model dynamics around the steady state. Section 4 investigates the 
model properties. A final section concludes. 
 
2. The Model 
We consider a continuum of households distributed in a unitary segment of mass one. 
Households can be of two different kinds: a fraction of them (1 λ − ) can access to the 
capital markets,
3 whereas the remaining proportion (λ ) cannot and thus has to consume 
                                                 
3 Spenders’ behavior can be interpreted in various ways, e.g. different interpretations include myopia, 
limited participation to asset markets or fear of saving. See Mankiw (2000) and references therein. Some 
evidence of the quantitative importance of rule-of-thumb consumers is provided by Campbell and Mankiw 
(1989), Jappelli (1990), Shea (1995), Parker (1999), Souleles (1999), Fuhrer (2000), Fuhrer and Rudebusch 
(2003) and Ahmad (2005).   4
all the current disposable income. We refer to them as rule-of-thumb or non-Ricardian 
households and to the former as optimizing or Ricardian households.  
Each optimizing consumer is assumed to maximize an inter-temporal utility function 
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and the capital accumulation equation  

















t C  and 
o
t L  represent consumption and leisure for optimizing household (hence we 
use a “o” superscript) and β   is the discount factor. The period utility take the 
Cobb-Douglas form inside a CRRA function, where  0 σ ≥  is the inverse of the elasticity 
of inter-temporal substitution of an aggregate factor composed by consumption and 
leisure, while  0 ν >  denotes a cost of working. 
o
t N  is the level of employment, where 
1
oo
tt LN =− ;  t W  denotes the nominal wage, 
K
t R  the nominal return on capital,  t K  the 
capital,  t I  the investment,  t D  the dividends from ownership of firms and  t B  the quantity 
of nominally risk-less bonds purchased in period t, maturing in period  1 t+ ; each bond 
pays  1 t R +  of money at maturity (hence  t R  is the nominal interest rate);
4 
Y
t τ  denotes the 
income tax rate.  





t K K φ
− −  represents the capital adjustment costs, which determines the 
change in the capital stock (gross of depreciation) induced by investment spending  t I . 
We assume  () 0 φ′ .> ,  () 0 φ′′ .≤ ,  ( ) 1 φδ ′ =  and  ( ) φ δδ = . The function of the adjustment 
costs is convex and the corresponding value of the equilibrium level of the ratio 
investment-to-capital stock is equal to the depreciation rate, i.e. in the steady state there 
are not adjustment costs.  
                                                 
4 In addition to the budget constraint, we assume that the Ricardian representative household is also 
subjected to a standard solvency constraint that prevents it from engaging in Ponzi-type schemes. Recall 
that non-Ricardian households do not save; thus they are not subject to the solvency condition.   5
The consumer choices consumption, leisure, investment and bonds by maximizing 
equation (1) subject to the constraints (2) and (3), in solving the inter-temporal 
optimization problem the tax rate and public expenditure are taken as exogenously given.  
By computing and rearranging the first-order conditions, one obtains the intra-temporal 
optimality condition setting the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and 
consumption equal to the real net wage; the Euler condition for the optimal inter-temporal 
allocation of consumption; the inter-temporal path of the Tobin’s Q. Notice that leisure is 
present in the Euler condition given our assumption of the form of the period utility 
function (which is not separable).  
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− ′ =∂ ∂ = ∂ ∂ ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦  is the Tobin’s Q or the real shadow value of 
capital. 
As said, a proportion λ of households follows a rule-of-thumb and thus these households 
do not borrow or save. We refer to them through the superscript “r.” Each period 
rule-of-thumb consumers solve their maximization problem, i.e. to choose the labor and 
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subject to the constraint that all their labor income is consumed  
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The associated first order condition is given by:  
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which can be combined with the budget constraint, rewritten as:  
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By remembering that  1
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Aggregate leisure can be rewritten in function of the employment  1 tt LN = − .    
Then we can formally write the weighted average of the variables for each consumer 
type:  
(13)  ( ) 1
or
tt t CC C λ λ =− +   
(14)  ( ) 1
or
tt t NN N λ λ =− +   
By substituting the constant employment for the rule-of-thumb households, we derive  










The aggregate first order condition is:  











=− −  
Regarding the supply side, we consider an economy vertically differentiated composed 
by two sectors. The final sector is perfectly competitive, while in the intermediate good 
sector producers are monopolistic competitors.  
More precisely, we assume a continuum of intermediate firms, uniformly distributed over 
the unit interval. Each firm produces a differentiated intermediate good that is combined 
in a competitive final sector, which uses a Dixit and Stiglitz technology. The final goods 
technology displays constant returns of scale and does not require labor or capital to 
produce a unit of the final good, but only intermediate commodities  th Y , . Formally,  
(17)  ()
1 1 1
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Any final good firm will potentially make profits defined by  
(18)  t t th th PY P Y dh π ,, =− ∫   
Each firm sets a price at each period to maximize its profits by considering its production   7
function. In formal terms, each firm maximizes equation (18) subject to (17). The 
assumption of free entry implies that profits will equal zero in equilibrium, the first order 
















We capture the degree of monopoly power of each firm by the gross markup ()
1 1 ε ε
− − , 
where  1 ε > .  
The production function for a typical intermediate goods firm is given by:  
(20) 
1
1 th t h th YK N
α α −
, −, , =   
where  th N ,  and  th K ,  represent the labor services and the capital, and α  the capital share. 
Profit maximization, taking the wage and the rental cost as given, is  
(21)  ( ) ( ) 1 Max 1 1
NK
th th th t t th t t h t PY W N RK τ τ
Π
,, , , − , ⎡⎤ Π= −+ − − ⎣⎦  
subject to (19) and equation (20), where 
N
t τ  is the labor tax rate and  t τ
Π  the corporate tax 
rate paid by firms and exogenously taken.  
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The firm’s first order conditions represent the input demand schedules.  
For the sake of simplicity, we assume a symmetric equilibrium. We then impose 
th tk t YYY ,, == ,  th tk t CCC ,, = = ,  th tk t I II .. = = ,  th tk t NNN ,, = =  for all  j  and  [ ] 01 k∈,.  
Intermediate firms set nominal prices as in Calvo (1983). Each firm resets its price with 
probability () 1 ω −  each period, while the remaining fraction ω  of producers keep their 
prices unchanged.  






tt k t k h t t k t k
P k
EY P P M C ω
∗
∞
⎡ ⎤ ∗ ⎛⎞
⎢ ⎥ ⎜⎟ ++ , + + ⎝⎠ ⎣ ⎦
=
Λ− ∑     8
subject to  () tk h t t htk YP P Y
ε ε − ∗
+, , + = , where  [ ]
1
1 tk t t t t R EP P
−
++ Λ=  is the discount factor,  t P
∗ 
represents the price chosen by firms resetting prices at time t and  t MC  the marginal cost 
at time t.  
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where  t P
∗ is the optimal price chosen by firms resetting at time t.  
We assume that a central bank set the growth of interest rate according to a standard 
Taylor rule (Taylor (1993)), which satisfies the Taylor principle, i.e. the nominal interest 
rate reacts more than one to the expected inflation.













where 1 π θ > .  
The Government spending is endogenously determined every period by balancing, in 
expected term, the following budget constraint:  
(28)  () 11 1
YK N t
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where  t G  is the government purchases.  
The following standard aggregate resource constraint must also holds:  
(29)  tt tt YCIG = ++  
that, of course, also includes investments and public expenditure.  
3. Dynamics around the Steady State 
In the long run our economy progresses to a zero-debt and a zero-inflation steady state, 
where, for the sake of simplicity, we also assume  1 P = . The budget constraint for the 
optimizers becomes  () ( ) 1
oo K Y CIW NR K D τ += + + − . The steady state for investment, 
                                                 
5 It is worth noticing that this rule always implies determinacy in the canonical model.   9
discount factor, marginal utility of wealth, Tobin’s Q are respectively:  KI δ = ,  1 R β = , 
()
oo o CL L
σ ν ν
−
⎡⎤ =Λ ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦
 and  1 Q = .  
By using the optimality conditions, we can derive the unique steady state of consumption 
for Ricardian households and capital rental cost in function of the coefficient of time 
preference ρ , equal to r  in the long run:  
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The same is for the rule-of-thumb consumers:  
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The steady-state analysis for the intermediate firms yields the following results 
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− =−  stands for marginal cost and  ()
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− =− is the mark-up. It 























Government and aggregate resource constraints are in the long run equal to:  
(35)  ()
1
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From equation (36) dividends are  ( ) ( )( )
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The share of public expenditure is    10
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After some tedious algebra, we obtain the steady state level of aggregate employment:
6  
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We can rewrite the level of employment, consumption, and Ricardian consumption as: 
() ()
1 11
o NN λ λν
− =− + + ,  ( )( )
1 11
Y CW N ν τ
− =− − ,   () ()
1 11
oY CW ν τ
− =+ −  and, by 
combining these aggregate equations, it is possible to obtain the consumption steady state 














ν γ +− == .  
Disregarding on tax rate, the resulting linear equations of the firm’s optimality conditions 
are:  
(42)  ( ) 1 1 tt t yk n αα − =+ −  
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where  ˆt µ  represents the (log)deviations of the gross markup from its steady-state level, 
which is equal to the inverse of the marginal cost, i.e. () n ˆt t MC µ = −  in logs.  
The log-linearization of the production function (17) and of the first order conditions ((22) 
and (23)) gives us the transition dynamic of the output (42) and the input demand 
schedules ((43) and (44)). The labor demand curve is downward sloping and depends 
negatively upon the labor taxation. The New Keynesian Phillips Curve is derived by   11
solving the firm’s maximization problem (24) in a standard manner.
7  
Regarding, the log-linearized version of the household’s optimality conditions, the 
log-linearized version of the capital accumulation equation is:  
(46)  ( ) 1 1 tt t kk i δ δ − = −+   
By rewriting the Ricardian leisure as a function of the aggregate employment (notice that 
() 1
o




tt N ln λ γ − − =−  and  tt ln ϕ = − , where  1
N
N ϕ − =  is  the 
steady-state inverse Frisch labor supply elasticity), the optimal conditions for Ricardian 
and Non Ricardian consumers can be rewritten as 
r
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Ricardian consumers take account of the employment and the income tax rate, while the 
level of the employment of the rule of thumb is constant. The Euler equation is standard 
except for the presence of the deviations in employment. The presence of the deviations 
in employment is justified by the fact that the marginal utility of consumption in each 
period depends upon the leisure. If  1 σ < , the marginal utility of consumption and leisure 
are positively related. An increase in current labor decreases the marginal utility of 
consumption and, ceteris paribus, current consumption must decrease.  
The log-linearized version of the aggregate labor supply is:  
(47)  ttt t wpc n ϕ − =+   
and log-linearized consumption is  ( ) 1
or
to t r t cc c λ γλ γ =− + . After some algebra we also 
obtain 
r














−+ + =− , the aggregate Euler Equation is thus:  
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The log-linear equations describing the dynamics of Tobin’s Q and its relationship with 
investments are:  
(49)  ()( ) ( ) 11
1 II
tt t t t qi k i k φδ δ
η
− − =− − = −   
(50)  ( ) ( ) ( ) 11 1 1 11
k
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where η  represents the elasticity of the investment-capital ratio with respect to Q.  
                                                                                                                                               
6 See the appendix A for details.   12
The log-linear equations describing the dynamics of government purchases, dividends 
and aggregate resources around zero-debt steady state are given by:  
(51)  () ()
()
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where  g s  is given by equation (38).  
(52)  ( ) ˆ 1 ttt t dpyε µ −=+−   
(53)  tc t i tg t ys cs is g = ++   
The central bank sets the level of interest rate in such a way that a standard Taylor rule is 
followed:  
(54)  tt y t ry π θ πθ = +   
It is worth noticing that the targets of the above rule are consistent with the steady-state 
properties of the model.   
We can now combine equilibrium conditions (42)-(54) to obtain a system of difference 
equations describing the log-linearized equilibrium dynamics of our economy. The 
system is composed of 13 equations and in 13 unknowns variables ( t y ,  t k ,  t n , 
K
tt rp − , 
ˆt µ ,  t π ,  t i ,  tt wp − ,  t c ,  t n ,  t r ,  t g ,  tt dp − ).  
 
4. Calibration and Analysis of Equilibrium Dynamics 
We use numerical methods for studying the uniqueness of the equilibrium and to provide 
a theoretical reason to the conditions that guarantee the uniqueness of equilibrium. More 
precisely, we will focus on the difference between our conditions and those stressed by 
Galì et al. (2004) for the case of lump-sum taxation in order to check if the latter can be 
generalized.  
We calibrate our model following Galì et al. (2003), to compare the stabilization 
properties of a Taylor rule to their results. The labor disutility is set to obtain a steady state 
employment equal to 12 /  without tax distortions as in Galì et al. (2003). For the tax rates 
we use the values estimated by Busato et al. (2005),
8 whereas monetary policy follows a 
                                                                                                                                               
7 See e.g. in Walsh (2003: Appendix 5.7.3). 
8 Calibration of the tax rates however does not matter for our results. We present in the appendix a 
sensitivity analysis in order to evaluate the robustness of our main results.   13
standard Taylor rule. The table below summarizes the value assumed for the parameters.  
 
Table 1 – Model calibration  
Deep parameters   09 9 β = .    1 ϕ =    1 σ =    1 η =    
  03 3 α = .    6 ε =    0 025 δ = .    0.7 ν =  
Calvo’s parameter   07 5 ω = .   0.8 λ =     
Monetary policy   15 π θ = .    05 y θ = .      
Tax rates   03 5 τ
Π = .    01 5
N τ = .    01 2
Y τ = .     
 
 
The share of government expenditures ( ) g s  is endogenously determined taking account 
of the balanced budget policy rule.  
Before stressing our results, it is useful to briefly discuss those of Galì et al. (2003, 2004) 
since we generalize their approach, as Galì et al. (2003) emerges as a particular case of 
our model (i.e. by assuming all the tax rates equal to zero).  
Galì and coauthors show that the presence of rule-of-thumb consumers can dramatically 
change the properties of the interest rate set accordingly a Taylor rule. In particular, the 
combination between a high degree of price stickiness and a large share of rule-of-thumb 
consumers rules out the existence of a unique equilibrium converging to the steady state. 
Both frictions are necessary for having indeterminacy.
9 This result is driven by two 
imperfections: the presence of rule-of-thumb and counter-cyclical markups.
10 A decline 
in markups, associated to an increase in the economic activity, allows real wages to 
increase (see equation (44) disregarding taxes). Then the increase in real wages generates 
inflation and a boom in consumption among non Ricardian consumers. If the weight of 
the rule-of-thumb is sufficiently large, the rise in their consumption will more than offset 
the effect of the rise in interest rate on Ricardian consumption. In other words, the high 
share of rule-of-thumb can invert the mechanism of the Taylor principle. A shock in 
economic activity and inflation can be self-fulfilled, and fluctuations are induced by 
indeterminacy in the equilibrium path. That possibility is facilitated by a high relative risk 
aversion, since it dampens the response of the consumption of Ricardian households (as 
                                                 
9  Once that the Blanchard and Kahn’s (1980) conditions are not satisfied, the equilibrium may be 
indeterminate and thus displaying sunspot fluctuations even when the interest rate rule satisfies the Taylor 
principle.  
10 That characterizes this kind of models.   14
we can see in equation (48)). 
In our model the indeterminacy might be contrasted by fiscal policy. In Figure 1 we show 
the dynamic response of the aggregate variables when a positive shock hits the economic 
activity and fiscal policy is explicitly considered according to the baseline calibration. 
There the output expansion is ruled out jointly by the increase of the real interest rate and 
the reduction of the aggregate demand. In fact real interest rate moderates consumption 
spending by financially unrestricted consumers and reduces private investment; taxation 
on profits reduces tax revenues and government expenditures. 
About here figure 1 
In our model the sunspot mechanism stressed by Galì et al. (2003) can thus be ruled out 
by corporate taxes. Since the corporate tax rate burdens dividends, a decline in markups is 
now associated to a reduction in government expenditure. The positive effect on 
dividends driven by the increase in output is more than offset by a negative effect leaded 
by a decrease in markups, since the variation of profits share affects dividends stronger 
than the variation of the output level. Because of the consequent reduction of aggregate 
demand the expansionary mechanism is hindered; therefore, the increase in 
non-Ricardian consumption can be more than offset by the decrease of public expenditure. 
Corporate tax rate, by burdening markups, is able to stabilize the economy when the 
Taylor rule is unable to do it.  
Table 2 shows that when the share of rule of thumb consumers is high enough, only a 
small threshold rate on profits could guarantee the uniqueness of the equilibrium, given 
that the Taylor rule needs a very high threshold inflation coefficient.  
 
Table 2 - Rule of thumb consumers, threshold inflation coefficient and threshold profit tax rate 
λ   π θ   π τ  
0.1-0.6 0.94  0 
0.7 3.7  0.07 
0.8 12.2  0.26 
0.9 24.4  0.44 
 
In our calibration, taxation on profits affects conditions for indeterminacy: sunspots are 
less likely to be observed under fiscal distortions (see figure 2 below). As point out by 
Galì et al. (2003), results are strongly affected by the relative risk aversion and degree of 
stickiness. In our framework these effects are depicted in figure 2.   15
About here figure 2 
The relative risk aversions may have strong effects on determinacy properties of a Taylor 
rule. Figure 2 shows the change of the regions of indeterminacy for the case of  1 σ =  
(panel (a)) and  5 σ =  (panel (b)). When  1 σ =  the weight of the Ricardian-consumption 
reduction induced by monetary restriction is more important, indeterminacy requires a 
larger size of rule-of-thumb consumers relative to the case of  5 σ = .
11  
Regarding the Calvo’s parameter, in New Keynesian models, the impact of the current 
output (via markup) on current inflation by the Phillips curve is larger for low values of 
the Calvo’s parameter. Then the Taylor principle does not hold and multiple solutions 
become possible.
12 
By considering steady state value of employment smaller than 1/2, which is a smaller 
value than those commonly used in the literature, the share of rule of thumb consumers 
necessary to modify the regime of determinacy becomes higher than values presented in 
the case of Galì et al (2004). In fact, an equilibrium value of employment of 1/3 rises the 
share of rule-of-thumb consumers necessary for an indeterminacy regime to about 0.8, a 
value very similar to our result in presence of fiscal distortions, despite the ceteris paribus 
calibration used by Galì et al (2003, 2004), i.e. employment equal to 1/2. Therefore, the 
lack of robustness of their findings is emphasized by a lower employment steady state 
value since a very small corporate tax structure is more likely to remove regions of 
indeterminacy in presence of a monetary Taylor rule. 
Figure 3 depicts the impulse responses when a negative cost push shock is considered; 
counter-cyclical wage markups are easily observable. Despite of the increase in output, 
dividends follows the same pattern of markups, as previously highlighted. Nonetheless in 
Figure 3b we verify that the effect of a decrease in markups dominates the effect of an 
increase in output. Government expenditure diminishes, but aggregate demand rises 
because of the increase in real wages and non Ricardian consumption (and in private 
investment). However, if tax revenues did not reduce then it would be more probably 
associated to a presence of multiple equilibria. Again, taxation on profits plays a central 
role in avoiding sunspots. By contrast, an increase in labor or income tax rate implies an 
increase in government expenditure even if markups decline, and therefore, the regions of 
                                                 
11 Robustness of our results is also shortly discussed below and sensitivity analysis provided by appendix B.  
12  The indeterminacy caused by the excessive response of monetary policy has been emphasized by 
Bernanke and Woodford (1997). See also Clarida et al. (1998, 1999) and Woodford (2004).   16
indeterminacy are not restricted.  
About here figure 3 
Figure 4 shows how government expenditures increase after a negative cost push shock if 
only income taxation is considered. This is due to an increase in output. In this case if the 
share of rule-of-thumb consumers is equal to 0.67, as in the previous simulations, it is not 
possible to rule out sunspot equilibria through the intervention of fiscal policy and, hence, 
we have re-calibrated the share of rule-of-thumb consumers to 0.66.  
About here figure 4 
Figure 5 describes the impulse responses in presence of the taxation on labor. In this case 
it becomes more difficult to observe equilibrium determinacy. In fact, labor taxation is 
strongly pro-cyclical and destabilizing, thus in Figure 5 we have to diminish the share of 
rule of thumb consumers to 0.6, in order to depict the impulse response functions to a 
negative cost push shock. Again, it results that government expenditures are strongly very 
positively correlated with output.  
About here figure 5 
Summarizing, we show that Galì et al. (2004) is not indifferent to fiscal policy structure. 
Our general result is that balanced budget rule and corporate tax distortions
13 facilitate the 
Taylor criterion since, in such a case, sunspot-driven fluctuations in the business cycle are 
less likely to be observed. This occurs because when a sunspot mechanism driven by a 
decline in markups could act, the taxation on profits dampens the aggregate demand, 
through the reduction of government expenditure. Hence it breaks the movement leaded 
by the animal spirit hypothesis at the heart of the sunspot mechanism, i.e., the 
self-fulfilling prophecy of an expansion of the economic activity.  
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
Following the recent developments of literature on rule-of-thumb consumers in New 
Keynesian monetary model, we analyze the support of monetary and fiscal policies to 
saddle-path solutions by studying the determinacy of the rational expectation equilibrium. 
                                                 
13 In our model, dividend taxation is distortionary. There is a strong debate about the neutrality of dividend 
taxation (e.g. old and new view of dividend taxation, see Sinn, 1991). More precisely, in our context tax 
non-neutrality arises by introducing a non-separable utility function. In such a way the steady state value of 
employment changes the optimal condition in labor supply, since steady state empliyement is entailed by 
dividend taxation through government expenditures (see equation (47)).   17
We show that the properties of standard models augmented with rule-of-thumb 
consumers and fiscal policies are not indifferent to the taxation structure.  
We find that corporate taxation implies a new conjoint fiscal and monetary stabilization. 
Although the Taylor principle is in fact generally known as a compelling criterion of 
policy stabilization, we show that if general conditions are present (as e.g. balanced 
budget rule and taxation of firms’ monopoly rents), it is not necessary to set an aggressive 
interest rate response to inflation to avoid equilibrium indeterminacy, as corporate tax 
rate can interact with monetary policy and fiscal policy could even substitute the 
monetary policy in order to stabilize the economy.  
Our main contribution is to show that, in a New Keynesian model augmented with 
rule-of-thumb behavior, a balanced budget rule may actually reduce the scope for 
indeterminacy. Hence, price rigidities and endogenous government expenditure lead to 
opposite result to the conventional ones found e.g. by Schmitt-Grohè and Uribe (1997) in 
flexible price environments. We however only partially confirm Guo and Harrison (2004) 
as, under balanced budget rule, only profit taxation successes in stabilizing economy, 
whereas e.g. income taxation increases the scope of instability. 
Specifically, by extending Galì et al. (2003, 2004) to a fiscal policy based on an 
endogenous expenditure financed by tax distortions and satisfying a balanced budget 
constraint, we show that fiscal policy is non-neutral with respect to equilibrium 
determinacy since balanced budget policy facilitates the stabilizing properties of the 
Taylor rule by restricting the possibility of sunspot-driven fluctuations in the business 
cycle. If public spending is partially financed through taxes on dividends, these might fall 
when the markup declines, thus contributing to reduce inflation even in an economy with 
a large fraction of non-Ricardian consumers. An increase in corporate tax rate thus makes 
sunspot equilibria less likely to emerge. 
The rationale of our result is as follows. An expectation-driven increase in activity gives a 
rise in real wages and a decline in firm markups due to price stickiness. Lower markups 
mean lower revenues from corporate taxation, because tax rates are kept constant. Hence, 
in order to balance the budget, government cuts expenditures which in itself reduce 
aggregate demand. This effect of fiscal policy runs completely opposite to the effect of 
rule-of-thumb consumption, since the latter generates a positive correlation between real 
wages and aggregate demand. Hence, when rule-of-thumb behavior destabilizes the   18




Appendix A – Labor disutility and steady state employment 
The steady-state level of aggregate employment is obtained as follows.  
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By using equation (40), after tedious algebra, the above expression can be also rewritten 
as: 
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Equation (a.3) with equation (38) determines the level of employment as a function of the 
deep parameters only. It can be rewritten as: 
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  which can be used to find the labor disutility consistent with a given level of 
employment.   19
Appendix B – Sensitivity Analysis 
 
Table 1B – Sensitivity analysis on output coefficient, capital adjustment cost, and labor elasticity  
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Figure 4 – Dynamic response to a negative cost push shock (λ=0.66; τП= τN =0; τY =0.1) 
(a1) (a2) 
(b1) (b2) 
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Figure 5 – Dynamic response to a negative cost push shock (λ=0.6; τП= τY =0; τN =0.1) 
(a1) (a2) 
(b1) (b2) 
 
 
 